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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
INCOME TAX REFUND PART OF BANKRUPT'S ESTATE
In re Kokoszka
Within the past twenty-five years, the number of personal insol-
vencies has risen at a phenomenal rate.' This increase has created a
substantial burden upon the government's judicial and legislative ma-
chinery to provide equitable relief to both debtors and creditors.
Pursuant to constitutional mandate2 the law in this area is partially
governed by the Federal Bankruptcy Act.3 Section 70(a)(5) of the Act
provides that a trustee shall, upon the bankrupt's filing of a petition
in bankruptcy, obtain title to all of his transferable property interests.4
The scope of the specific property encompassed by this section has
been a source of uncertainty.5 The Supreme Court has held that a
broad definition should apply.6 Thus if the item was "sufficiently
rooted in the pre-bankruptcy past and so little entangled with the
bankrupt['s] ability to make an unencumbered fresh start" it would
be included within the bankrupt's estate.7
The Second Circuit, in In re Kokoszka,8 ruled that title to a
bankrupt's income tax refund checks vests in the trustee in bankruptcy.
I In 1950, there were 18,000 cases of personal bankruptcy. For the fiscal year ending
June 30, 1967, this total rose to 208,000. H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968),
2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1962, 1978 (1968). Currently, it is estimated that each year
one American in a thousand files a petition in bankruptcy. As a result, $2 billion in debts
are cancelled. D. STANLEY & M. GuRTI, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PRocEss, REroRM 1 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as STANLEY & GIRTH].
2 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
3 11 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1970). The states also make provision for insolvency proceedings.
See, e.g., N.Y. DEBT. & C.F. LAW (McKinney 1945).
4 In pertinent part, § 70(a)(5), 11 U.S.C. § l10(a)(5) (1970), provides:
(a) The trustee of the estate of a bankrupt . . . [shall] be vested by operation of
law with the title of the bankrupt as of the date of the filing of the petition
initiating a proceeding under this title, except insofar as it is to property which
is held to be exempt, to all of the following kinds of property wherever located
... (5) property, including rights of action, which prior to the filing of the peti-
tion he could by any means have transferred or which might have been levied
upon and sold under judicial process against him, or otherwise seized, impounded,
or sequestered....
5 See In re E.V. Moore of Calif., Inc., 447 F.2d 1106, 1108 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 995 (1971), where the court stated that there are "difficulties which confront an
inferior federal court which must interpret words such as 'property,' 'wages,' and other
words in the Bankruptcy Act, and apply those words to specific sets of facts, before the
Supreme Court has had occasion to elaborate the conflicting policies which urge its
members in one or another direction."
o Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 379 (1966), where the Court set down the general
rule that: "The main thrust of § 70(a)(5) is to secure for creditors everything of value the
bankrupt may possess in alienable or leviable form when he files his petition. To this end
the term 'property' has been construed most generously."
7Id. at 380. In Segal it was determined that a tax refund resulting from a loss-
carryback claim was property within the meaning of the statute. A primary example of
items that are not so includable is future wages. Id. See In re Aveni, 458 F.2d 972 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 877 (1972).
8 479 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1973).
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This decision involved three cases wherein tax refund checks were
received by the appellants after they had filed bankruptcy petitions.
Each party was ordered by the referee to turn over the entire proceeds
to the trustee.9 After consolidating the cases, the district court held
that in accordance with section 70(a)(5), the tax refunds were part of
the bankrupts' estate.10 The petitioners appealed to the Second Cir-
cuit contending that the right to a tax refund, where the minimum
amount allowable had been withheld, was not subject to the require-
ments of section 70(a)(5). Alternatively, they argued that even if the
tax refunds were deemed property under the Bankruptcy Act, only
25 percent of them would vest in the trustee by virtue of the Con-
sumer Credit Protection Act's limitation on garnishment.,'
Kokoszka was precipitated by the Supreme Court's decision in
Lines v. Frederick. 2 There, the Court resolved the issue of whether
or not vacation pay, which became payable after an individual filed
for bankruptcy, vested in the trustee. Interpreting the objective of the
Bankruptcy Act as to provide the debtor with a "new start in life,"'3
the Court held that vacation pay should not vest in the trustee. How-
ever, in recognition of creditor interests, Lines was narrowed to situa-
tions "[w]here the minimal requirements for economic survival of the
debtor are at stake ... ."1 Notwithstanding this caveat, Lines repre-
sents a major shift from the broad approach previously applied.15
9 The amounts refunded were $250.90, $201.97, and $136.00 respectively. In each case,
these amounts represented the only assets in the bankrupt's estate. Only one of the three
complied with the order pending the determination of the litigation while the other two
disobeyed the order by spending their refunds. Id. at 993.
In prior decisions, the right to the refund was deemed to accrue as of the moment the
withholding was made and not as of the date a tax return was filed. See, e.g., In re
Goodson, 208 F. Supp. 837 (S.D. Cal. 1962), where a petition in bankruptcy was filed on
November 30, 1960, but a tax return for 1960 was not filed until sometime after January 1,
1961. The court determined that as of the date of bankruptcy, the right to eleven-twelfths
of the tax refund had accrued to the bankrupt. As a result, this portion of the refund was
ordered transferred to the trustee.
In each instance in Koko ka, the bankruptcy petitions were filed in the year follow-
ing that for which the tax refunds were due. Therefore, there was no need for appor-
tioning the refund between the bankrupts and the trustee. For example, Kokoszka filed
on January 5, 1972, and the trustee sought his refund for overwithholdings on 1971
wages.
10 Herbert Sands, No. 36,028, Frank O'Brien, No. 36,197, Henry A. Kokoszka, No.
37,437 (D. Conn., July 21, 1972).
1115 U.S.C. § 1673 (1970).
12 400 U.S. 18 (1970) (per curiam).
13 The Court noted: "Mhe basic purpose of the Bankruptcy Act [is] to give the
debtor a 'new opportunity in life and a clear field for future efforts, unhampered by the
pressure and discouragement of pre-existing debt." Id. at 19, quoting Local Loan Co. v.
Hunt, 292 U.S. 234,244 (1934).
14 400 US. at 20.
15 In recent years, the law of bankruptcy evolved to the point where liberal treatment
is afforded the honest but unfortunate debtor. The Supreme Court has indicated a will-
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Although prior law indicated that the trustee would acquire title
to all claims of a bankrupt for repayment of taxes,'8 appellants anal-
ogized to Lines. They claimed that the tax refund is a specialized type
of property and as such is protected by virtue of the Court's decision
in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.7 Moreover, inasmuch as the
receipt of the tax refund was an annual event, the taxpayer comes to
rely on it. Therefore, the petitioners reasoned, it is analogous to ac-
crued vacation pay and necessary to provide a fresh start.
Appellants' position was bolstered by In re Cedor, 8 a Ninth Cir-
cuit opinion holding that the tax refund was not property within the
meaning of the Bankruptcy Act. There, the characteristics of tax re-
funds were analyzed in light of the reasoning adopted in Lines. It was
noted that minimum tax withholdings and accrued vacation pay are
similar in various respects. For example, once the tax is withheld the
employee cannot recover any part of it prior to his filing a tax return
the following year. Similarly, accrued vacation pay is unavailable un-
til the employee takes his vacation or terminates his employment.
Also, both the tax withholding and the accrual of vacation pay are
not subject to the consent of the employee. He, in effect, has no option
but to agree to the requirements of the Government or the procedures
of his employer. Finally, both a tax refund and payment of vacation
pay are anticipated as annual events by the wage-earner, and he comes
to rely on receipt of these funds.19
ingness to invoke its equity powers to relieve the debtor of the burdens of his indebted-
ness, thereby allowing him to make a fresh start in life. See 73 W. VA. L REV. 302, 306
(1971). See also Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 103 (1966). One author feels it
would be extremely easy for a court to rationalize any desired decision under the "fresh
start" concept applied in Lines. Greenfield, Lines v. Frederick: The Effect of Bankruptcy
on a Bankrupt's Accrued Vacation Pay and Other Forms of Deferred Compensation, 47
L.A. BAR BULL. 67 (1971).
16 See 4A W. CoLLTR, BANKRUPTCY 70.28(4) (14th ed. 1971).
17 395 U.S. 337 (1969). There, the Court determined that a prejudgment garnishment
of wages violated procedural due process. In so holding, the Court's reasoning appeared
heavily influenced by the special nature of wages as opposed to other forms of property.
The Court described wages as "a specialized type of property presenting distinct problems
in our economic system," and the garnishment's result as the "driv[ing of] a wage-earning
family to the wall." Id. at 340, 341-42.
18 337 F. Supp. 1103 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd, 470 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam). It
should be noted that conflicts had arisen concerning this issue among the lower courts in
the Ninth Circuit. In In re Kingswood, 343 F. Supp. 498 (C.D. Cal.), rev'd, 470 F.2d 996
(9th Cir. 1972), the district court expressly disagreed with the reasoning applied in Cedor.
In doing so, it accepted a referee's finding that refunds were property within the meaning
of section 70(a)(5) and as such vested in the trustee. See In re Wetteroff, 453 F.2d 544 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972); In re Goodson, 208 F. Supp. 837 (S.D. Cal.).
19 This reasoning, expressed by District Judge Wollenberg in In re Cedor, 337 F.
Supp. 1103 (N.D. Cal. 1972), was adopted by the Ninth Circuit, 470 F.2d 996 (9th Cir.
1972) (per curiam).
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Although these similarities were given credence in In re Cedor,
the Second Circuit found them unpersuasive. In rejecting the peti-
tioner's claim Judge Anderson, writing for a unanimous panel,20
interpreted Lines very narrowly.21 He noted that although Sniadach
and Lines referred to wages as a specialized form of property warrant-
ing special protection, this protection does not extend to all property
merely because wages can be traced as the ultimate source. "[T]o
do so would exempt from the bankrupt estate most of the property
owned by many bankrupts, such as savings accounts and automobiles
which had their origin in wages." 22 Additionally, the court held that,
merely because the tax refund may be anticipated as an annual event,
this fact does not make it necessary for the basic requirements of life.
Judge Anderson observed that other annual payments such as a Christ-
mas club or annual dividends vest in the trustee and "[p]ermitting
a bankrupt to retain his tax refund would not be giving him a 'fresh
start' to accumulate new wealth but a 'head start' over others who had
no such refund."23
The second issue confronting the Second Circuit in Kokoszka
was whether the refund should be deemed partly exempt within the
terms of the Consumer Credit Protection Act's limitation on garnish-
ment, thereby limiting the trustee to 25 percent of the amount re-
funded.24 Looking to the legislative intent, the court held that the tax
refund did not represent disposable earnings, as defined in that Act.25
One purpose of the statute was to prevent debtors from plunging into
bankruptcy. Also, it was hoped that such a limitation would insure
adequate weekly support for the debtor and his family.2 6 Based on
these factors, the court felt that the statute was designed to guarantee
20 The panel consisted of Judges Anderson, Kaufman, and Mansfield.
21 Judge Anderson stated: "What we have in Lines is a very narrow exception to the
general proposition that everything of value passes to the trustee, i.e., vacation pay which
will become essential for basic week to week support in the future does not pass." (empha-
sis added). 479 F.2d at 994-95.
22 Id.
23 Id,
24 15 U.S.C. § 1671 et seq. (1970). Section 1672(a) defines earnings as: "compensation paid
or payable for personal services, whether denominated as wages, salary, commission, bonus,
or otherwise, and includes periodic payments pursuant to a pension or retirement pro-
gram."
2515 U.S.C. § 1673 (1970) provides, in pertinent part, that "the maximum part of the
aggregate disposable earnings of an individual for any workweek which is subject to
garnishment may not exceed (1) 25 per centum of his disposable earnings for that
week .... " Disposable earnings are defined in Section 1672(b) as "that part of the earn-
ings... remaining after the deduction from those earnings of any amounts required by
law to be withheld."
20 See H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), 2 U.S. CODa CONG. & AD. Nvs
1962, 1977-19 (1968).
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that basic needs could be met from the debtor's "take home" weekly
wages.27 Since the refund did not represent such compensation, it was
deemed excluded from the limitation.28
The Second Circuit, in Kokoszka, properly concluded that tax
refunds neither fall within the Supreme Court's exemption in Lines
nor within the statutory limitations on garnishment. When the Court
promulgated the "fresh start" approach in Lines it was solely con-
cerned with avoiding the effects of depriving a wage-earner of "the
new opportunity in life which the Bankruptcy Act intended to pro-
vide."'29 Vacation pay has generally been considered a form of addi-
tional wages, 80 the function of which is to "support the basic require-
ments of life . . . during brief vacation periods or in the event of
layoff."' 1 The tax withheld was not of that nature since it had lost
its status as wages and had become a claim against the Government.32
When refunded, its normal function would be to supplement the
wages of the bankrupt rather than to provide basic life requirements.
Based on these factors, the Second Circuit's denial of exempt status
to tax refunds appears sound and fits within the guidelines set by Lines
and prior Supreme Court decisions.88 Yet, it is arguable that substan-
27 479 F.2d at 996-97. This view seems further supported by the statutory wording
which applies the limitation only to "disposable earnings of an individual for any work-
week." 15 U.S.C. § 1673(a) (1970).
28 By virtue of this holding, Kokoszka stands in direct conflict with the Ninth Circuit.
See In re Cedor, 337 F. Supp. 1103 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd, 470 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1972), where it
was held that the refund had not lost its character as wages. As the Gedor district court
stated: "There does not appear to be any reason of policy why the amount of the refund
should be held to have lost its character as earnings by reason of its somewhat circuitous
route to the wage-earner's hands." 337 F. Supp. at 1107. This conclusion appears inconsis-
tent with the established position that, once withheld, the amount loses its character as
wages and becomes a claim against the Government. See note 32 infra. Despite interesting
arguments in Cedor for the position that bankruptcy orders fall within the Consumer
Credit Protection Act, 337 F. Supp. at 1107, the court's position lacks validity without an
initial determination that the tax refunds are earnings. See 4A W. COLLIER, BANKimurcY
70.34 (14th ed. Supp. 1972).
29 400 U.S. at 20.
80 See In re Wil-low Cafeterias, Inc., II1 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1940).
ar 400 U.S. at 20.
82 See 4A W. COLLIER, BANKRUrrcY 70.28(4) (14th ed. 1971). The tax refund's status
is further discussed in a referee's report in the opinion in In re Kingswood, 343 F. Supp.
498 (C.D. Cal.), rev'd, 470 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1972).
33 The court held:
Because a tax refund is not the weekly or other periodic income required by a
wage earner for his basic support, to deprive him of it will not hinder his ability
to make a fresh start unhampered by the pressure of pre-existing debt. Therefore,
the tax refund is ... property which passes to the trustee.
479 F.2d at 995.
Such a holding is further supported by consideration of the decision upon which
Lines is, in part, based, viz., Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969). There, a
state prejudgment garnishment procedure, which could result in the debtor being de-
prived of all his wages, was declared invalid. Clearly, less hardship exists where vacation
pay, as in Lines, is involved. See 49 N.C.L. REv. 738, 745 (1971). A further extension to
tax refunds could easily be considered a strained interpretation.
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tial justice was not done by the Kokoszka court. The refunds were
relatively small and comprised the only asset in the bankrupts' estates.
After compensating the trustee for his services, little or no funds would
remain thereafter for payment to creditors.3 4 Judge Anderson noted
that "[c]learly the purpose of the Bankruptcy Act was to benefit credi-
tors and debtors, not trustees."35 Nonetheless, the Second Circuit's
suggestion that the debtor use the remedy of abandonment 36 is unpal-
atable. To gain such relief, the debtor has the burden of making the
appropriate motion. Realistically, the awareness of such a procedure
depends on legal advice, which may be as expensive as turning over
the refund to the trustee.37 One method which may be implemented
to provide relief for debtors in this situation would be a provision for
exemption allowances whereby trustees would not be permitted to
claim title to tax refunds below a certain level.88 However, provision
of such relief is a legislative function. In light of the conflict between
the Second and Ninth Circuits, the resolution of this issue may well
lie with the Supreme Court.3 9
The court's logic is also supported by In re Jones, 337 F. Supp. 620, 624 (D. Minn.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1040 (1972). There, the court noted the decision in Lines, but re-
fused to apply it to a tax refund, saying "[ilt is not clear... that wages withheld prior
to adjudication are so entwined with the bankrupt's future wage earning activity that they
should receive the same treatment as future wages." See also In re Kingswood, 343 F.
Supp. 498 (C.D. Cal.), rev'd, 470 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1972).
84 The court noted that a trustee can receive up to $150 in fees no matter how small
the bankrupt's estate. 479 F.2d at 995. If such were the case here, one estate would be
completely used for trustee's fees while the other two estates would be left with balances
of $100.90 and $51.97, respectively, for creditors.
85 Id. at 995-96.
36Id. at 996. See In re Mirsky, 124 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 638
(1942).
The abandonment process requires the debtor to set forth evidence that no injustice
would result if the creditors abandoned the assets and no trustee was appointed. The
decision to deny or grant the motion is discretionary with the referee. It should be granted
if (1) all the assets will be consumed by trustee's and administration fees, (2) there is not
a likely opportunity that the trustee will recover additional assets, and (3) the trustee's
absence will not cast a burden on the bankruptcy court. 479 F.2d at 996. Upon a granting
of a motion, the bankrupt retains whatever title he originally had in the assets. In re
Wattley, 62 17.2d 828 (2d Cir. 1933).
For a discussion of the procedure and effects of abandonment when a trustee has
already been appointed see Note, Abandonment of Assets by a Trustee in Bankruptcy, 53
COLmi. L. REv. 415 (1953).
37 STANLEY &- GmTH, supra note 1, at 85, comment: "Debtors who are carefully advised
and who can wait do not file in bankruptcy until tax refunds have been cashed and spent
-frequently for attorney's fees and costs."
38 Id. at 86. See In re Kingswood, 343 F. Supp. 498 (C.D. Cal.), rev'd on other grounds,
470 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1972).
39 The Bankruptcy Act, itself, indicates its authors' willingness to incorporate within
the Act exemptions enacted by both the Congress and state governments. Section 6 of the
Act, 11 U.S.C. § 24 (1970), provides: "This title shall not affect the allowance to bank-
rupts of the exemptions which are prescribed by the laws of the United States or by the
State laws in force at the time of the filing of the petition...." The burden may well be
upon the various legislatures to correct any possible injustices created by decisions such as
Kokoszka.
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